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The paper deals with Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis’s (1698-1759) writings on the principle of 
least action (PLA). I discuss Maupertuis’s philosophical interpretation of the PLA by analysing three 
of his papers (1740, 1744, 1746), in order to assess the overall consistency of his argument. As I shall 
argue, Maupertuis presents the PLA as a universal principle of nature, this being at odds with the 
empiricist inspiration of his epistemology. Maupertuis’s attempt to introduce conceptual elements 
borrowed from the Leibnizian tradition into a Newtonian-inspired framework creates in fact a tension 
that is difficult to overcome.  
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Introduction 
 
In 1740, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759) was invited by Frederick II 
of Prussia to be the chairman of the Berlin Academy of Sciences. Thenceforth, 
Maupertuis would increasingly become uninterested in regular scientific practice, and 
inclined more towards philosophical speculation1. The development of Maupertuis’s 
interest in philosophical matters roughly coincides with this biographical episode, and 
is tightly linked to the formulation of the «principle of least action» (PLA)2. In what 
follows, I shall discuss a few epistemological questions linked to Maupertuis’s 
formulation of PLA, most notably the relationship between physical laws and 
metaphysical principles. This I shall do by relying on three of his papers (Maupertuis 
1740, 1744, 1746), which represent three successive steps toward the formulation and 
philosophical framing of the PLA. I shall start from the core epistemological                                                         
1 See Brown 1963 and Casini 1983. 
2 I am not going here into the scientific details of the PLA. There is abundant secondary literature on 
PLA: see Brunet 1929, Fee 1941, Feher 1988, Pulte 1989, Radelet De Grave 1998, Leduc 2015, and 
Lyssy 2015. 
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distinction between “first-type principles” and “second-type principles,” and proceed 
by assessing Maupertuis’s attempt to make natural laws – in particular, the laws of 
geometrical optics – consistent with metaphysical principles of high generality. I shall 
then inquire into the extent to which Maupertuis’s argument is indebted to Leibniz’s 
discussion of the laws of optics, and end with a critical presentation of Maupertuis’s 
own proof for the existence of God. 
 
1. First-Type Principles versus Second-Type Principles 
 
At the outset of the Loi du repos (Maupertuis 1740), Maupertuis distinguishes 
between two different kinds of principles on which all the sciences3 are grounded. 
 
If the sciences are grounded on certain simple and immediately clear principles, on which all the 
truths that are the object thereof depend, they have yet other principles, less simple indeed, and 
often difficult to discover, but which once discovered, are of very great utility. These are in 
some way the laws Nature follows in certain combinations of circumstances, and which teach us 
what it will do on similar occasions (Maupertuis 1740, 170). 
 
Here, Maupertuis formulates the core epistemological distinction between “first-
type principles” and “second-type principles”. Second-type principles are «less 
simple» and «difficult to discover», and coincide with particular laws of nature (e.g. 
the principle of the lowest centre of gravity in statics and that of the conservation of 
living forces in dynamics4), whereas first-type principles are «simple and immediately 
clear». If the status of second-type principles is sufficiently clear, thanks to the 
examples Maupertuis himself provides, the status of first-type principles remains on 
the contrary vague5. Scholars have suggested various interpretations for first-type 
principles: they might e.g. be general metaphysical principles6, or physical axioms of 
the mathematical sciences7.  
Things, however, get trickier when Maupertuis specifies other features of both 
kinds of principles, in particular concerning their demonstrability. 
 
Principles of the first type hardly require any demonstration for their evidence is clear to the 
mind as soon as it examines them. The principles of the second type, however, are not 
                                                        
3 Not only mechanics, as Marco Panza suggests (Panza 1995). 
4 These are the examples Maupertuis himself mentions. 
5 See Van den Abbeel 2017, 61-63. 
6 Beeson 1992, 165. 
7 Terrall 2002, 175. 
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susceptible of physical demonstration in the strict sense, because it is impossible to go through 
all the cases in which they occur (Maupertuis 1740, 170). 
 
It is impossible to provide any demonstration of first-type principles, as the 
knowledge of them we have is intuitive8. Second-type principles, on the contrary, are 
demonstrable, but are not so a pedibus usque ad caput. A few lines later Maupertuis 
comments further on this point: 
 
These principles have never been given a general demonstration in the strict sense; but no 
one who is accustomed to study the sciences, and who knows the force of induction, 
will ever doubt their truth (Maupertuis 1740, 170).  
 
Second-type principles are demonstrated according to the methodological lines 
Newton gave in the Principia (1687) and in the Opticks (1704). As the fourth Regula 
philosophandi reads, 
 
In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be 
considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet 
other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. This rule 
should be followed so that arguments based on induction may not be nullified by hypotheses 
(Newton 1999, 796). 
 
And again, in the General scholiu9: «In this experimental philosophy, propositions 
are deduced from the phenomena and are made general by induction» (Newton 1999, 
943). Maupertuis stresses the reliability of Newton’s inductive method, although this 
method provides no complete demonstration for the propositions at stak 10 . Our 
understanding is too weak, and our knowledge too scanty, to enable us to follow the 
whole chain of reasons and causes11. If we could do so, our demonstrations of second-
type principles would be completely a priori: 
 
As of a priori demonstrations of these kinds of principles, it seems that physics is not able to 
provide them; they [a priori demonstrations] seem to belong to some superior science 
(Maupertuis 1740, 170). 
 
                                                        
8 It is hard to see, then, how first-type principles could be identified with axioms of Newtonian 
mechanics (axiomate sive leges motus), which seem to require a stronger foundation than mere 
intuition. 
9 Published for the first time as an appendix to the 2nd edition of the Principia (1713). 
10 On Newton’s inductivism, see Ducheyne 2012, 107-169, and Belkind 2017. 
11 Sources for this claim are Locke and the sceptical tradition: see Tonelli 1987. 
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Given the contrast between first-type and second-type principles which Maupertuis 
had established at the outset, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that the former 
might indeed be a priori. Their simplicity does not allow for demonstration though, as 
Maupertuis explicitly states. The intuitive status of first-type principles might likewise 
shed light on the meaning of the somewhat obscure expression «superior science». If 
a science superior to physics exists, it might be one that works entirely with a priori 
intuitive principles, i.e., with first-type principles. 
 The epistemological discussion carried out in the Loi du repos is relevant for it 
provides conceptual distinctions which will be useful in investigating Maupertuis’s 
effort to integrate physics with the «higher sciences» (metaphysics, theology). 
Moreover, the discussion of first-type and second-type principles, a priori and a 
posteriori demonstrations, and of a «superior science» suggests that – as David 
Beeson correctly stresses – «Maupertuis in this paper takes a step towards Leibnizian 
architectonic reasoning» (Beeson 1992, 167). 
 
2. Optics and Metaphysics 
 
2.1. PLA 
 
The 1744 paper Accord de différentes lois de la nature qui avaient jusqu’ici paru 
incompatibles is well-known for it includes the first clear formulation of the PLA. 
Although the argument deals with optics, this subject is for Maupertuis no more than 
«a memorable example» (Maupertuis 1744, 417), useful to discuss a general 
philosophical point. 
 
We should not expect that the different means we have to increase our knowledge should lead 
us to the same truths, but it would be shocking to see that propositions which philosophy 
presents as fundamental truths, were in fact contradicted by geometry or algebra (Maupertuis 
1744, 417). 
 
Maupertuis introduces here a first assumption: the truths which philosophy and the 
sciences – represented here by mathematics – teach should not be at odds with each 
other (the “truth-agreement” postulate). From this assumption a first problem arises, 
which the formulation of the PLA should come as an answer to: although undeniably 
true, the “truth-agreement” postulate seems to be contradicted by a few 
counterexamples, of which optics is perhaps the most striking.  
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There is yet another assumption grounding Maupertuis’s discussion, which, 
however, is made explicit only at the end of the paper. From this second postulate 
another assumption follows which Maupertuis’s argument is meant to ground. God 
exists, and has organised the world harmoniously. This harmony consists in the fact 
that a blind mechanism – the laws of nature, viz. second-type principles – executes the 
orders of a superior intelligence. The PLA will thus prove that it is good to employ 
final causes in the natural sciences12. 
I have mentioned that the discussion carried out in the Accord concerns optics, first 
and foremost because it provides a “memorable” counterexample to the “truth-
agreement” postulate. Why is this so? Maupertuis believes that, whereas the first two 
fundamental laws of geometrical optics – (1) light, in a uniform medium, moves in a 
straight line, and (2) the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection (the “law 
of reflection”) – are philosophically intelligible, for they have evident mechanical 
analogies (the law of inertia and elastic collision), the third law – the “Snell–
Descartes law” or “law of refraction” – is not 13. Such a law states that, in any 
refraction, the ratio between the sine of the angle of incidence and the sine of the 
angle of refraction is a constant determined by the mediums involved. This law lacks 
intelligibility because, as Maupertuis stresses, «when light passes from one medium to 
another, the phenomena are very different than when a ball passes through different 
mediums» (Maupertuis 1744, 419)14. 
Maupertuis distinguishes three interpretative options for the laws of optics, 
corresponding to three emblematic figures of seventeenth-century science: (1) A 
mechanical explanation (Descartes); (2) A mechanical explanation, which resorts to 
an additional non-mechanical assumption (Newton); (3) A non-mechanical 
explanation (Fermat). The accounts provided by both Descartes and Newton are 
immediately dismissed. If Descartes’s account is not physically accurate – «the way 
in which this great philosopher tried to explain this phenomenon is imperfect» 
(Maupertuis 1744, 419-420) – the same, however, does not apply to Newton’s and the 
Newtonians’ account. Alexis Clairaut, e.g., in his Newtonian-inspired theory of light,                                                         
12 As d’Alembert writes in the article «Action» of the Encyclopédie, Maupertuis’ cosmology is based 
on the attempt to “ally the metaphysics of final causes to the most fundamental truths of mechanics” 
(d’Alembert 1751, 119). 
13 For an account of modern discussions on optics, see Sabra 1981. 
14 In some sense, one should seek the “sufficient reason” for that law to be. As I will show, the PLA is 
characterized in much the same way as Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. See Terrall 2002, 177-
178. 
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«deduces the phenomena of refraction with the same clarity as all the other subjects 
he deals with» (Maupertuis 1744, 420). Although not explicitly stated, the problem 
with the Newtonians seems to be philosophical: Maupertuis seems indeed to assume 
that the Newtonian theory provides no appropriate metaphysical framework for 
physics15. 
Fermat’s method is therefore preferable, as it «seeks the explanation of these 
phenomena in a wholly different and purely metaphysical principle» (Maupertuis 
1744, 420). Fermat formulates, on the basis of empirical evidence, a most general 
principle: «Nature, in the production of its effects, always acts in the simplest way» 
(Maupertuis 1744, 421). Fermat generalizes this principle from optics to the whole of 
physics, arguing that all natural movements follow the shortest-path and shortest-time 
law. The metaphysical principle of economy grounds for Fermat the phenomenal 
level: both the «direct and reflexed movements of light – Maupertuis stresses – […] 
seem to depend on a metaphysical law» (Maupertuis 1744, 421; my emphasis). 
Maupertuis agrees with Fermat on the necessity to ground physical laws on a 
“higher” principle, but disagrees on the specific contents of Fermat’s argument. 
Fermat’s principle, according to Maupertuis, is incorrect, for the physical data from 
which it is deduced are not accurate. Fermat’s mistake is in fact to assume that light 
moves slower in denser mediums, and quicker in less dense ones. Maupertuis agrees 
with Descartes (and Leibniz) that the converse is rather true. The refraction of light, 
therefore, does not happen according to the shortest-path and shortest-time law. The 
metaphysical principle grounding the laws of optics is another one, namely that 
according to which the «quantity of action» is minimized, meaning the sum of the 
distances covered, each multiplied by the velocity with which the body travels 
through it. Only at this point do we find the first explicit formulation of the PLA: «It 
[light] takes a path that has a real advantage: the path it takes is that whereby the 
quantity of action is the least» (Maupertuis 1744, 423). «Once the true principle 
discovered», Maupertuis concludes, «all laws of light can be deduced from it» 
(Maupertuis 1744, 425). 
 
2.2. Epistemology and Metaphysics                                                         
15 When presenting Fermat’s position, Maupertuis says that Fermat rejects the Newtonian explanation, 
«although it is known that this principle [attraction] was neither unknown nor distasteful to him» 
(Maupertuis 1744, 420). In 1744, Maupertuis’s attitude towards Newton remains ambiguous; in 1746, 
on the contrary, Maupertuis expressly criticizes Newton and the Newtonians for their physicotheology. 
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The Accord provides further elements to pursue the discussion of epistemology 
started with the Loi du repos. In the above-quoted passage stating that «it would be 
shocking to see that propositions which philosophy presents as fundamental truths, 
were in fact contradicted by geometry or algebra» (Maupertuis 1744, 417), 
Maupertuis makes a clear-cut distinction between philosophical and scientific truths. 
Philosophy is about «fundamental truths», whereas the sciences are confined to 
contingent truths. According to Maupertuis, mathematics and geometry also deal with 
natural objects, at a higher level of abstraction than physics, and their conclusions are 
therefore contingent16. Prima facie, this opposition seems to reproduce that between a 
«superior science», including most general truths, and the other sciences, constructed 
with second-type principles. 
The discussion of optics and metaphysics, however, poses some challenges to this 
epistemological picture. In some passages of the Accord, particular scientific truths 
are said to depend on metaphysical laws – «the direct and reflexed movements of 
light […] seem to depend on a metaphysical law» (Maupertuis 1744, 421) –, whereas 
elsewhere it rather seems that scientific laws are the basis for the elaboration (or 
modification) of metaphysical laws – «on the basis of this fact, that light moves 
quicker in denser mediums, Fermat’s and Leibniz’s [metaphysical] construction is 
destroyed» (Maupertuis 1744, 422). It seems therefore reasonable to raise the question 
whether metaphysical principles ground physical laws, or the other way round. At the 
end of the paper, Maupertuis gives indications for solving the puzzle. To find «the 
causes of physical effects», we can either «[calculate] the properties of bodies», or 
«[search] what it was more appropriate to make them [the bodies] do» (Maupertuis 
1744, 425-426). These two methods roughly correspond to induction and deduction, 
i.e., bottom-up and top-down relations. De facto, Maupertuis says, since «the first 
method [induction] is within our reach, but it does not lead us very far», and «the 
second [deduction] sometimes misleads us, for we do not know which is the purpose 
of nature», we should «employ both methods[:] let us calculate the movements of 
bodies, but also consult the design of the Intelligence making them move» 
(Maupertuis 1744, 426). Our understanding is too weak and our knowledge too scanty 
to enable us to follow the entire chain of causes (either bottom-up, or top-down).                                                         
16 So Maupertuis will argue in the Examen philosophique de la preuve de l’existence de Dieu employée 
dans l’Essai de cosmologie (Maupertuis 1756, 393-394). 
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There is no logical primum; the whole research relies on an imperfect empirical 
procedure. 
This is how things are de facto. Such an explanation, however, does not provide 
any answer to the above-raised question whether metaphysical principles ground 
physical laws, or the other way round. How should things be de jure, then? The PLA 
seems to be formulated on an inductive basis. The research on optics provides 
evidence to formulate a general conclusion, grounded on phenomena, which is 
therefore a posteriori. This, of course, would make of the PLA a second-type 
principle, just like Newtonian attraction. The PLA, however, is clearly put on a 
different qualitative level than the laws of optics: it is hard to see, then, how induction 
can allow for such a qualitative passage. Moreover, Maupertuis argues that the PLA is 
a most general principle. As he writes in a further work (Letters, 1752): «I have 
showed that all laws of movement are grounded on the principle of least action: […] 
attraction itself depends on the principle of least action […]: it makes the bodies move 
as they should in order to obey this universal law of nature» (Maupertuis 1768b, 288-
289; my emphasis). According to the Loi du repos, induction cannot provide general 
(i.e., complete) demonstrations. If the PLA is a «universal law of nature» stricto 
sensu, it should therefore be a first-type principle17. Maupertuis’s ideas – at least 
regarding the situation de jure – are unclear. All the more so, if one considers that the 
PLA will become the basis of Maupertuis’s metaphysics, whose identification with a 
«superior science» looks in fact plausible. 
 
3. Leibniz and Teleology 
 
Maupertuis’s argument is deeply indebted to Leibniz’s teleological account of the 
laws of optics. Although Maupertuis never explicitly quotes Leibniz’s work on optics, 
he was certainly acquainted with Leibniz’s optical theories, which he fleetingly refers 
to18. Most importantly, the argument presented in the Accord is strikingly similar to 
                                                        
17 However, it is hard to see how the PLA might be «simple and immediately clear», and how it would 
«hardly require any demonstration» (Maupertuis 1740, 170) for its self-evidence. 
18 Maupertuis’s knowledge of Leibniz’s optics is indirect. As he says in the version of the Accord 
published in the 1756 edition of his Works: «When I read this paper [the Accord] in the Paris Academy 
of Sciences, I did know Leibniz’s work on optics only by what de Mairan says in his paper on the 
reflection of light, Mémoires de l’Académie de Paris, year 1723» (Maupertuis 1768c, 23). 
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Leibniz’s. A comparison between the two accounts might therefore be useful for 
clarifying the few difficulties in Maupertuis’s argument19. 
Although the only text by Leibniz on optics available to Maupertuis would have 
been the Unicum opticæ, catoptricæ, et dioptricæ principium (A Unitary Principle of 
Optics, Catoptrics, and Dioptrics), published in 1682 on the Acta Eruditorum, I shall 
rather focus on the Tentamen anagogicum, or An Anagogical Essay in the 
Investigation of Causes, written in 1695, but published in the course of the nineteenth 
century. Leibniz advances similar arguments in both papers; the Tentamen 
anagogicum, however, is much more detailed on the relationship between mechanical 
laws and teleological principles, and for this reason more relevant to my study. 
In the Tentamen anagogicum, Leibniz attempts to reconcile Descartes’s 
mechanical account of the laws of optics – particularly the law of refraction – with 
Fermat’s teleological account. The Cartesian objections to Fermat’s argument (light 
moves faster in denser mediums) are overcome by means of the «Most Determined 
Path Principle» (MDPP).20 A ray of light, Leibniz contends, always moves along the 
most determined path, which does not necessarily imply the minimization (or 
maximisation) of some quantity. Leibniz’s principle just states that «the easiest path 
would prevail among all the possible competing rays» (Leibniz 1989, 479), ease 
being defined as «the quantity obtained by multiplying the distance of the path by the 
resistance of the medium(s)» (McDonough 2009, 512). By means of this general 
principle, Leibniz can easily derive the “Snell–Descartes law” by means of 
differential calculus and basic trigonometry21. He thus manages to preserve Fermat’s 
teleological approach to optics – MDPP being a teleological principle – adjusting 
Fermat’s principle so as to make it consistent with Descartes’s mechanical account of 
phenomena. 
From the epistemological point of view, Leibniz acknowledges the fruitfulness of 
purely mechanical explanations: efficient causes alone can adequately describe what 
goes on in the physical world. Mechanical explanations, however, are per se 
insufficient and should be integrated with teleological principles: «The laws of motion 
cannot be explained through purely geometric principles or by imagination alone» 
(Leibniz 1989, 478). This is because, although mechanical causes can explain all                                                         
19 There is an abundant literature on Maupertuis and Leibniz. With particular reference to the PLA (and 
to the debates over this principle), see Kneser 1929, Brunet 1938, Bachelard 1961, Goldenbaum 2016. 
20 See McDonough 2009, 511-512. 
21 For the details of this derivation, see McDonough 2009. 
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physical phenomena, the ultimate principles of mechanics cannot themselves be 
explained mechanically, and need teleological principles in order to be grounded. 
 
All natural phenomena could be explained mechanically if we understood them well enough, 
but the principles of mechanics themselves cannot be explained geometrically, since they 
depend on more sublime principles which show the wisdom of the Author in the order and 
perfection of his works (Leibniz 1989, 478). 
 
The teleological account of natural phenomena has for Leibniz a twofold 
function 22. (1) It relates physical nature to God’s intelligent design. In corporeal 
nature, alongside the mechanical dimension, which Leibniz calls «the realm of power, 
according to which everything can be explained mechanically by efficient causes», 
there is another (and superior) dimension that he calls «the realm of wisdom, 
according to which everything can be explained architectonically, so to speak, or by 
final causes» (Leibniz 1989, 479). In nature, therefore, finalistic laws operate as a 
mark of the divine organization of the world. (2) Leibniz’s argument displays the 
inventive role of final causes in physics23. Teleology is for Leibniz a proper method 
for physical investigation: in the case of optics, «we may well believe that we should 
not have had this beautiful discovery [the law of refraction] so soon without the 
method of final causes» (Leibniz 1989, 480)24. Optics thus provides an interesting 
case study to demonstrate that teleology might work as a powerful explanatory 
device. 
 
So we begin here to show that no other reason can be given for the laws of nature than the 
assumption of an intelligent cause. Or we show also that in the investigation of final causes                                                         
22 On this point, see Duchesneau 1993, 263-264. 
23 In the Unicum opticæ too, Leibniz insists on this very point: «And so those who reject final causes in 
physics with Descartes err greatly – not to speak more harshly – since even besides the admiration of 
divine wisdom, they would also supply to us the most beautiful principle for discovering some 
properties of those things whose interior nature is still not so clearly known to us that we would be able 
to use proximate efficient causes and explain the machines which the Creator employed in order to 
produce those effects and in order to obtain his ends». Translated by Jeffrey K. McDonough. 
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rutherford/Leibniz/unitary-principle.htm#note1. Accessed 16 
January 2018. 
24 Leibniz thinks that Snell had first discovered the law of refraction, and that Descartes contributed 
little to the discovery. «It is known that Willebrord Snell, one of the greatest geometricians of his time 
and well versed in the methods of the ancients, invented it, having even written a work which was not 
published because of its author’s death. But since he had taught it to his disciples, all appearances point 
to the conclusion that Descartes, who had come to Holland a little later and who was most interested in 
this problem, learned it there. For the way in which Descartes has tried to explain the law of refraction 
by efficient causes or by the composition of directions in imitation of the reflection of bullets is 
extremely forced and not intelligible enough. To say no more about it here, it shows clearly that it is an 
afterthought adjusted somehow to the conclusion and was not discovered by the method he gives». 
(Leibniz 1989, 479-480). 
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there are cases in which it is necessary to consider the simplest or most determinate, without 
distinguishing whether this is a maximum or a minimum […]. Certain new general theorems 
can be derived which apply equally to refraction and reflection (Leibniz 1989, 484-485). 
 
As we see, Leibniz insists on the heuristic role of teleological principles. The 
inventive power of such principles is well displayed by the case of optics, where 
MDPP would have not been found without recourse to teleological reasoning.  
Leibniz, however, wants to go as far as to imply that teleological principles might 
have a heuristic function in all fields of knowledge. As he writes in the Definitiones 
cogitationesque metaphysicae (1678-80): «All the phenomena of nature can be 
explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient cause; and all the 
phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no 
final cause»25. According to Leibniz, therefore, all mechanical laws might a priori be 
rephrased in the vocabulary of teleology. This, however, remains without proof. As 
Daniel Garber remarks, «the idea of parallel explanatory structures everywhere in 
nature seems a kind of speculative program for a natural philosophy, grounded in a 
metaphysical vision rather than in detailed argument, empirical or otherwise» (Garber 
2009, 259).26 
Let us now come back to Maupertuis. What does he retain of Leibniz’s teleological 
conception? No doubt that the PLA meets requirement (1). As I shall argue in a 
further section, Maupertuis considers the PLA the most universal law of nature and, 
as such, the clearest tangible proof of God’s intelligent design. The PLA is the 
architectonic law par excellence, through which the Creator has organised the world, 
and therefore the cornerstone of the «realm of wisdom». As for requirement (2), 
things change significantly. Although Maupertuis vindicates the PLA’s explanatory 
power, stating that we should “employ both methods” – «calculate the movements of 
bodies, but also consult the design of the Intelligence» (Maupertuis 1744, 426) – to 
come to the right conclusions, a careful analysis of his argument shows, however, that 
the PLA does not meet requirement (2). The “both-methods” statement remains 
without consequence, not only in the Accord, but in further works too. In the 1744 
paper, the PLA is formulated on the basis of the scientific inquiry into the laws of 
optics (the «realm of power»), but, once formulated, does not seem to have any 
particular heuristic function. Rather, the PLA is a generalisation, subsuming already-                                                        
25 Quoted in Garber 2009, 258. 
26 For interesting remarks on this point, see Andrault 2016, 107-109. 
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known laws under a single formulation. All Maupertuis looks for is in fact the 
agreement between particular mechanical laws and a general metaphysical principle, 
which is formulated après coup in order to make the picture of physical reality more 
consistent and unitary. Of course, this criticism points to the use Maupertuis de facto 
makes of the PLA: this, one might say, tells us nothing about the de jure status of the 
principle. This I grant. We should, however, note that Maupertuis’s ideas on the de 
jure situation, as I showed, are quite confused; the reference to the de jure status of 
the PLA might therefore not be an easy way out of the objection. 
In the end, it seems that the main – perhaps the only – application of such a 
generalisation is the proof of the existence of God Maupertuis formulates by means of 
the PLA27. 
 
4. The PLA and the Proof of the Existence of God 
 
At the outset of the paper Les lois du mouvement et du repos déduites d’un principe 
métaphysique (1746), Maupertuis states that, after discovering the PLA, his present 
objective is «to draw from this very source some higher and more important truths» 
(Maupertuis 1746, 267). In section 2 of the Lois du mouvement, one finds indeed a 
detailed presentation of Maupertuis’s PLA-based demonstration of the existence of 
God. 
From the very title of the section, one gathers Maupertuis’s key assumption: «That 
the proofs of the existence of God are to be sought in the general laws of nature» 
(Maupertuis 1746, 277)28. This, for a twofold reason: (1) general laws are universal, 
therefore they do not suffer any exception, and (2) they are simple, therefore 
unequivocal. The criteria of universality and simplicity, however, should be further 
specified in order to be actually informative. When can a law be said to be universal? 
It does indeed make a difference if one conceives the method of knowledge to be 
inductive – in which case, universality is such only par provision – or deductive. And 
then: what are the criteria of simplicity for a law? Maupertuis overlooks such 
definitional questions, and rather focuses on operative ones: how do we get to 
universal and simple laws? He answers by mentioning a discipline that should lead 
this research, namely mathematics.                                                         
27  I am only referring to Maupertuis’s own use of the PLA. Other scientists will develop the 
mathematical consequences of the PLA and apply it to, e.g., the study of planetary motions (Euler). 
28 An important source for this claim is of course Malebranche. 
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Why mathematics? Mathematical laws are universal and simple, but also 
absolutely certain (although not necessary29): «Such [mathematical] certainty does not 
depend on the method the geometers follow, but on the simplicity of the objects they 
consider» (Maupertuis 1746, 278). While not claiming the irrelevance of method, 
Maupertuis emphasizes the nature of the object as the decisive criterion to attain 
certainty – universality, although not mentioned, is closely related to simplicity. The 
question thus arises of what role the appeal to mathematics plays in this context. 
There are a few theoretical options on the table. (A) Mathematics might be a mere 
example from which to draw inspiration: mathematicians produce certain proofs, so 
should philosophers. (B) The method of mathematics should likewise be used in 
metaphysics. Although prima facie plausible – Christian Wolff, and many eighteenth-
century philosophers with him, hold this very position – this option is explicitly 
discarded by Maupertuis when he says that «[mathematical] certainty does not depend 
on the method the geometers follow». (C) Mathematical demonstrations and theorems 
should play some direct role in metaphysics. This is the option Maupertuis endorses. 
His choice is grounded on a specific epistemological assumption: 
 
Let us see if we can make a better use of this science [mathematics]. The proofs of the 
existence of God it will provide should have over all others the advantage of being 
evident, which is typical of mathematical truths. Those who do not trust metaphysical 
reasoning will be more at ease with these kind of proofs (Maupertuis 1746, 278). 
 
When Maupertuis states that the existence of God should be proved through 
mathematics, he seems to presuppose an axiom, one might call the «transitivity of 
certainty (TOC) axiom». If the demonstration proving that proposition x 
(mathematical) is true can be used to prove also that proposition y (non-mathematical) 
is true, then proposition y will hold the same degree of certainty that proposition x 
does. The axiom works well in all cases where mathematical models are used to 
demonstrate non-mathematical statements (typically, physical laws). The question 
Maupertuis leaves unasked, however, is whether the TOC axiom holds even when y is 
of a wholly different nature than x, e.g., for metaphysical and theological 
propositions. This appears indeed harder to believe. 
                                                        
29 Later on in his career, Maupertuis will further reflect on the notions of contingency and necessity: 
see Charrak 2006. 
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Leaving aside the problem raised by the TOC axiom, let us come back to 
Maupertuis’s argument, and see how it continues. Maupertuis specifies which 
mathematical laws attention shall be focused on: 
 
The Supreme Being is everywhere, but is not everywhere visible to the same extent. We shall 
better see Him in the simplest objects: let’s search for Him in the first laws he imposed on 
nature […] according to which movement is conserved, distributed, or destroyed (Maupertuis 
1746, 279). 
 
This is not surprising, since the PLA is a universal law overruling motion in 
physical nature. Surprising, however, is what Maupertuis states immediately 
afterwards, concerning method. 
 
I could have started from these laws such as they are given by mathematicians, and confirmed 
by experience, searching therein the marks of God’s wisdom and power. However, as those 
who formulated these laws relied on hypotheses that were not purely geometrical, and 
therefore their certitude seems not to be established in strict demonstrations, I thought it better 
and more useful to deduce such laws from the attributes of the almighty and all wise Being. If 
the laws I find in this way are the same as those we observe in the universe, wouldn’t this be 
the strongest proof that this Being exists, and that He is the author of these laws? (Maupertuis 
1746, 279) 
 
The laws of motion, insofar as they are grounded on experience, are not certain in 
an absolute sense. Mathematics, as all other natural sciences, relies on ancillary 
hypotheses that are – at least to some extent – arbitrary. Maupertuis insists on this 
very point in other texts as well, most notably in the Réflexions philosophiques sur 
l’origine des langues et la signification des mots (1740). Here he says: «What we call 
‘our sciences’ depend so closely on the ways in which we first designated 
perceptions, that I think the questions and propositions would all be different if we 
had established other expressions out of our first perceptions» (Maupertuis 1768a, 
268)30. 
Maupertuis’s claim on the uncertainty of the laws of motion, formulated 
inductively, poses some problems. Mathematical demonstrations would indeed be less 
strict than purely deductive demonstrations, namely those solely relying on a priori 
principles. It is therefore hard to see how mathematics could be the norm for the                                                         
30 And also: «I do not think the diversity of their [people of remote countries] philosophy derives from 
any difference in their first perceptions, but rather from the accustomed language of every country, 
from this destination of signs to the different parts of perceptions: destination which is very much 
arbitrary, and that the first men could have done in so many different ways […]» (Maupertuis 1768a, 
275-276). 
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strictness of metaphysical demonstrations. (Although indeed Maupertuis discards 
option (B), options (A) and (C) are still on the table.) 
Of particular interest is the method Maupertuis claims he will follow: «I thought it 
better and more useful to deduce such laws from the attributes of the almighty and all 
wise Being. If the laws I find in this way are the same as those we observe in the 
universe […]». Since the inductive formulation of the laws of motion is not absolutely 
certain, one should rather deduce them top-down, from the divine attributes. If the 
results of the deduction coincide with those of the induction, then one gets the 
strongest confirmation of their accuracy. Far from being exhaustive, Maupertuis’s 
explanation creates more confusion than clarity. Indeed, if (bottom-up) induction, in 
the context of the eighteenth-century Newtonian-inspired empiricist philosophy, is a 
univocally defined concept, (top-down) deduction is not – this is a fortiori the case if 
deduction is to be made from the attributes of God. 
Maupertuis starts with a historical survey of the philosophers’ ideas on motion. 
Some ancient philosophers, confronted with the difficulty of making sense of 
movement, denied its reality. This is because, Maupertuis says, the only source of 
knowledge we have about movement is experience, and experience can always be 
doubtful. Of some propositions, however, we can acquire reliable knowledge by 
means of reiterated experiences or relevant counterexamples: e.g., motion is not 
essential to matter, and matter cannot move itself if not impelled by some external 
cause. The question is not therefore whether matter moves or not, nor whether motion 
is essential to it, nor whether it can move itself, but what is the external cause causing 
it to move. Philosophers, Maupertuis says, variously tried to answer the question – 
appealing to an unmoved mover (Aristotle) or to God (Malebranche) – though 
unsuccessfully. This because they lacked a fundamental principle, which the laws of 
motion obey: «It was necessary to know that all laws of motion and rest are grounded 
on the most suitable principle (le principe le plus convenable)31 to see that they had 
been established by an all wise and almighty Being» (Maupertuis 1746, 282). In an 
updated version of the 1746 paper, namely the first part of the Essai de cosmologie 
(1750)32, Maupertuis further comments: «Therefore, I shall not look for these laws [of 
motion] in mechanics, but in the wisdom of the Supreme Being» (Maupertuis 1768a,                                                         
31 In the Essai de Cosmologie (1750), Maupertuis rather says: «on the principle of the best (le principe 
du mieux)» (Maupertuis 1768a, 35). 
32 Which is otherwise the same text as Maupertuis 1746. 
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35). Although the only source of knowledge of motion is experience, the principle 
underlying the very structure of motion is a priori. Maupertuis does not justify this 
assumption. To do so, the only argument he could adduce is a circular one: laws of 
motion are grounded on the principle of the best because God is their author, the 
strongest proof that God is their author being that they are grounded on the principle 
of the best. 
Pursuing his discussion, Maupertuis notes that modern authors – Descartes, 
Huygens, and Leibniz – were not much bothered by discussions on the nature of 
motion, but rather focused on the laws according to which «it is distributed, 
conserved, and destroyed» (Maupertuis 1746, 283). After mentioning the debate over 
the existence of hard bodies 33 , Maupertuis discusses Descartes’s and Leibniz’s 
opposing views on the conservation of movement. Descartes argued that the quantity 
of movement is constant in nature, whereas Leibniz held that living force (measured 
by the product of the mass and the square of velocity) is a constant. Yet, Maupertuis 
contends, «conservation of movement is true only in some cases, [and] conservation 
of force takes place only for certain bodies. Neither of them can be considered a 
universal principle, nor a general result (un résultat général) of the laws of motion» 
(Maupertuis 1746, 285). Maupertuis himself is the first who has in fact discovered the 
truly universal principle of motion, namely «the principle of least action: so wise a 
principle, and so worthy of the Supreme Being» (Maupertuis 1746, 286). From here, 
Maupertuis concludes: «The laws of movement and rest deduced from this principle 
are precisely the same as those we observe in nature» (Maupertuis 1746, 286). 
The conclusion of the argument is therefore that the laws of movement one finds 
through empirical investigation are the same as those one can deduce from the PLA. 
The PLA thus plays the role of the explanans, rather than of the explanandum. In 
other words, the PLA is not the law that is to be deduced, but a most general principle 
from which to deduce particular laws. But how is this principle found? This 
Maupertuis leaves unsettled. To begin with, no deduction from the attributes of God – 
whatever this might mean – takes place. Two alternatives then remain: if the PLA is 
found intuitively, it might count as a first-type principle, and be the cornerstone of 
some «superior science»; if on the contrary it is found inductively, it would be a 
second-type principle, more general indeed than all other second-type principles – not                                                         
33 On this debate, see Shea 1988.  
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absolutely general and universal, though. Maupertuis hesitates over these two 
alternatives, none of which is fully and satisfactorily argued. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have tried to highlight some of the difficulties to be found in 
Maupertuis’s writings (1740-1746) on PLA. It emerges from my analysis that the 
epistemological status of PLA is problematic insofar as Maupertuis tends to present it 
as a universal principle of nature even though this claim is incompatible with the 
empiricist inspiration of his philosophy. While Maupertuis’s idea of scientific method 
is mostly borrowed from Newton, the influence of the Leibnizian tradition pushes him 
toward architectonic reasoning: this creates a tension in his argument that cannot be 
easily resolved. 
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